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1 Introduction 
Ever since the end of the Second World War, the member states of the EU have attempted to 
form a collective security and defence policy to improve their collective defence and 
overcome obstacles to their security. This has led to the formation of several EU security and 
defence organisations. The EU’s security and defence policy is currently managed via its 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) and its military arm via the Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP). In addition, many EU member states (but not all) are members 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), a military alliance that, together with the 
United Sates (US) and Canada, provides military capabilities for the collective security of its 
members. NATO connects the US and many EU countries together strategically; this is often 
referred to as the transatlantic relationship. 
 
In 2016, however, the EU launched a new security strategy called the European Union Global 
Strategy (EUGS). In this strategy paper, the EU called upon its member states to form a 
stronger defence policy to cope with new external threats and challenges. The two most 
pressing external threats are: the annexation of the Crimea peninsula by Russia and the 
resulting unrest in the Donbas region that has destabilized Ukraine and caused concerns 
regarding the stability of the region and the EU’s territorial integrity (EUGS, 2016: 33) and 
the instability in the Middle East, which has brought forth ISIS and the threat of terrorism 
(EUGS, 2016: 34–36). Subsequently, in June 2017, the Commission launched the reflection 
paper for the future of European defence (European Commission, 2017), an attempt to answer 
the question raised in the EUGS on how to achieve a stronger EU defence policy. The 
European Commission emphasises the need to improve this policy area because ‘the nature of 
the transatlantic relationship is evolving. ‘More than ever, Europeans need to take greater 
responsibility for their own security’ (European Commission, 2017:11).  
 
In the reflection paper, the Commission challenged the member states first to strengthen the 
institutional format of their defence policy so that it is better able to develop defence 
capabilities and, second, to create a new format for future CSDP missions (European 
Commission, 2017: 6).  
 
This thesis studies how various obstacles have influenced the development of new initiatives 
that aim to improve the EU’s military capabilities and the future of CSDP missions in order to 
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strengthen EU’s security and defence policy. Three challenges will be examined: The 
reflection paper indicates that the Commission felt that institutional challenges had prevented 
its defence policy from building adequate defence capabilities and launching successful 
CSDP missions. Second, in the EUGS and reflection paper (see page 6), the EU emphasised 
that the actions of the Russian Federation (RF) posed a geopolitical security threat to the EU; 
these actions may be viewed as geopolitical obstacles. Third, the election of Donald Trump 
created a new US presidency that puts renewed emphasis on sovereignty and national 
interests and demands a larger contribution from the Europeans through NATO for its 
security and defence. This caused a change in the transatlantic relationship and has 
consequences for the NATO alliance. In responds the EU calls for the strengthening of its 
security and defence policy. Since many EU members rely both on NATO and the EU for 
their security and defence, this can be seen as a strategic obstacle.  
 
However these obstacles are having an effect on the EU’s security and defence policy because 
they sparked new developments that affected this policy area. Nevertheless far to little 
attention has been paid to explain how these challenges become obstacles to the EU’s security 
and how in turn they led to new developments that changed the EU’s security and defence 
policy.    
 
Therefore, the main question addressed in this thesis is: How have institutional, geopolitical 
and strategic obstacles led to new developments that have affected the EU’s security and 
defence policy? 
 
Answering this question is important because studying these obstacles may expose flaws and 
weakness in the EU’s security and defence policy and contribute to the better understand of 
the new developments in this policy area for future research. It may also answer whether the 
EU will be able to overcome the institutional, geopolitical and strategic obstacles to its 
security.   
 
Sub-questions addressed in this thesis are as follows:  
 
 1- what are the institutional obstacles to cooperation and have they led to new developments?  
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2- how does Russia comprise a geopolitical obstacle and how has this led to new 
developments?  
 
3- how does the change in transatlantic relationship form a strategic obstacle and how has it 
influenced new developments?  
 
4- what are the new initiatives in EU military capability development and CSDP missions and 
how do they affect the EU’s security and defence policy?    
 
In addition to the above-mentioned threats and challenges to the EU’s security, others have 
been mentioned in the EUGS and reflection paper, including: the refugee crisis, which divides 
the member states; the North-South division in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the Brexit; 
and climate change. These challenges will not be discussed in this thesis, however, because 
they do not explain the EU’s call for improvement of military capability development and 
CSDP missions. This thesis will instead focus on the challenges that have directly influenced 
the EU’s defence policy and can best explain these changes.  
 
In the next chapter, the methodology is explained, followed by the results of the main 
research in five subchapters and a final chapter for the discussion and conclusion.  
 
The first subchapter analyses the institutional obstacles and their consequences for EU 
security. This is achieved by analysing past EU defence institutions to discover the 
institutional obstacles to cooperation they faced and whether there is continuity in these 
obstacles. Special attention is given to how this has hindered progress in developing military 
capabilities and effectively launching CSDP missions, since the EU mentions these as the 
policy area that needs improvement.    
 
The second subchapter analyses how the EU perceives a strong threat from the foreign policy 
of the RF and how this creates a geopolitical security obstacle.  
 
The third subchapter analyses how the difference in strategic policies between the US and the 
EU under President Donald Trump has led to a change in transatlantic relationship.  
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The fourth subchapter analyses the new developments the EU has undertaken and proposed to 
the member states in response to institutional, geopolitical and strategic obstacles, both in 
terms of military capability development and CSDP missions. Secondly, it looks at how the 
member states have responded to the EU’s proposals.  
 
 The fifth subchapter analyses how these new developments have affected the EU’s security 
and defence policy, both in terms of the EU’s capacity for military capability development as 
well as its ability to undertake military (CSDP) missions.  
 
To answer the main question I will analyse both primary and secondary sources. Primary 
sources will be documents produced by the EU itself concerning its security and defence 
policy and secondary sources produced by scholars in the relevant field produce that made 
assessments of the EU’s security and defence policy.   
2 Methodology  
The analytical research method of Process Tracing (PT) was used to trace the process within 
the EU’s security and defence policy and craft a minimum explanatory outcome of why this 
policy area was recently changed. Bennet (2010) compares it with the work of a detective 
who tries to solve a crime by looking for a convincing explanation for the offenses based on a 
large range of tips, indications, traces and evidence. This process was best-studied using 
Explaining outcome PT (Beach & Pedersen, 2013), because this form of PT is not theory 
driven with the desire to develop theoretical insights, but designed to find a minimal 
explanation for the single case that is researched; in this case why EU’s security and defence 
policy is changed as a result of the institutional, geopolitical and strategic obstacles to the 
EU’s security and defence policy area. Using PT allowed this research to show the causality 
between these variables (institutional, geopolitical and strategic obstacles) and find the 
explanation of why the EU’s security and defence policy is changed. The investigation of EU 
documents and secondary literature showed changes in the EU’s security and defence policy. 
These changes are due to events and developments that form threats to the EU’s security thus 
leading to the process of changing the EU’s security and defence policy area.  
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3 Main Research  
3.1 Institutional obstacles to the cooperation of (past) European defence organisations  
 
This chapter is an historical analysis of the integration process of the EU’s security and 
defence policy and the institutions that managed it: the West European Union (WEU), CFSP, 
the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), European Defence Agency (EDA) and the 
CSDP. This chapter shows the institutional obstacles that the EU faced in developing military 
capabilities (also referred to as ‘hard power’) and the ability to perform stabilization and 
security missions. This chapter also demonstrates that there is continuity in the institutional 
obstacles faced by this policy area and how this affected the EU’s security. Further, it helps to 
explain why new developments have been undertaken to change the institutional setup of the 
EU’s security and defence policy area. After the analysis of each institution, there is a short 
paragraph about the institutional obstacles and their consequences for security. 
3.1.1 Decision-making in the EU’s security and defence policy  
Before analysing the institutional challenges of this policy, an explanation is given as to how 
decision-making functions in EU institutions. It should be noted that the EU is not a single 
state, but a collection of 28 member states that are bound together by a common institutional 
framework (the EU) and in its security and defence institutions formed (or attempted to form) 
a strategic concept for collectively dealing with security and defence issues (Nugent, 2010: 
377).  
 
 There are two forms of governance for EU institutions: supranationalism and 
intergovernmentalism. Supranationalism is a mode of governance in which ‘a centralized 
governmental structure possesses jurisdiction over specific policy domains within the 
territory comprised by the member states’ (Larive, 2014: 24). This concept of 
supranationalism in decision-making, in which a common institution overrides the jurisdiction 
of the member states in the policy area ascribed to them, is a core aspect of the EU’s 
governance. When forming these institutions, however, member states are not always willing 
to forgo their sovereignty in favour of supranational EU decision-making, especially within a 
policy area concerning security and defence politics. States may therefore opt for an 
intergovernmental form of decision-making for cooperation instead.  
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Intergovernmentalism is ‘the process of governance wherein the member states are the main 
actors and are bargaining between one another in order to produce common policies’ 
(Larive, 2014: 24). In this case, the member states remain the main actors in their decision-
making and ultimately shape the interests of the institutions. This means that in order to 
produce common (security) policy, the EU must depend upon the ‘political will’ of the 
member states; sometimes, because member states have different interests, an agreement 
cannot be reached, hindering progress. Furthermore, because decision-making is 
intergovernmental and member states have veto power, one member state can limit progress 
within an entire policy area (Nugent, 2010: 383). This could potentially limit the ability of the 
EU’s security and defence policy to provide security. The inability of these institutions to 
function (and thus provide security) due to the EU’s decision-making system is referred to as 
‘institutional obstacles’ in this thesis. 
 
With regard to decision-making in the EU’s security and defence institutions it is also 
important to note the different military strategic cultures within the EU. Most, but not all, EU 
member states are part of NATO. Some member states favour NATO as Europe’s prime 
security organisation and are afraid that any EU defence organisations will undermine NATO; 
these member states are called ‘Atlanticists’. The most outspoken Atlanticists are the UK and 
Denmark (Nugent, 2010: 383). Other countries who are not Atlanticists but do not necessarily 
want more EU cooperation in this area include the Netherlands, Portugal (Howorth, 2014: 
118–120) and the Eastern European countries (who see NATO as the surest passage to their 
state survival and are afraid EU policy may undermine this; De France and Witney, 2013: 4–
8). Other member states that are not part of NATO (Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Austria, Cyprus 
and Malta) fear that an EU defence policy that is excessively tied in with NATO undermines 
their neutrality; they feel the same regarding integrated European defence policy; they are 
referred to as ‘Neutrals’ (Nugent, 2010: 383). There are also countries that are part of NATO 
but favour EU defence cooperation over NATO, mostly because of the role played by the US. 
They are called ‘Europeanists’, and France is a prime example (Nugent, 2010: 386). The fact 
that these strategic cultures exist in combination with the intergovernmental decision-making 
system may make it difficult to progress in this policy area. 
3.1.2 Institutional obstacles to the start of the EU’s security and defence policy 
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR in 1991 changed the geopolitical 
security environment entirely. The need for a defence organisation that provides military 
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assistance in territorial defence lessened substantially with the disappearance of the military 
threat posed by the USSR. During the Cold War, the EU did not play a large role in security 
and defence politics, and France had stopped the EU from obtaining a security and defence 
policy by vetoing a supranational EU defence organisation, the EDC (Keukeleire & Delreux, 
2014: 41). To secure enough military hard power against the USSR, the EU countries, 
together with the US and Canada, instead signed the NATO military alliance. The alliance 
mostly relied on the military hard power of the US, with the EU countries in a supportive role.  
There are various definitions of the terms hard power and soft power. In this thesis, ‘hard 
power’ describes the use of military means to either deter or coerce the behaviour of other 
actors (Matlary, 2018:7). ‘Soft power’ as used in this thesis refers to a wide set of tools—such 
as economic and state-building capacities (Howorth, 2014:70–74)—implemented in order to 
persuade an actor to change its behaviour.  
 
In the new post-Cold War world, however, a new security and defence organisation was 
required that was less focused on territorial defence but could bring about security via 
intervention and conflict resolution. The EU now had the ‘political will’ among its members 
to institutionalise a security and defence policy area (on which the member states had not 
been able to agree during the Cold War). With the Maastricht treaty of 1992, the EU 
institutionalised a common foreign and security policy, the CFSP. The Common Foreign and 
Security Policy created an institutionalised foreign policy mechanism to collectively tackle 
security issues in a new geopolitical environment; it would be equipped with EU policy in 
peace building, crisis management, and more, defining the Union’s new security tasks in the 
new post-Cold War world (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014: 48). Institutionally, the decision-
making system of the CFSP would be intergovernmental, and unanimity in the Council would 
be required (Nugent, 2010: 380). This was done because the member states deemed foreign 
affairs too sensitive for national sovereignty to have a supranational decision-making method, 
which applies in other EU policy areas (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014: 48).  
 
The war in Yugoslavia erupted in 1991, and the EU saw this as an immediate test case for 
Europe’s new role as a security actor that could secure its own region in the new post-Cold 
War world. The European countries intended to put an end to the conflict without the help of 
the US and in cooperation with international institutions such as the UN; Luxembourg’s 
foreign minister, Jacques Poos, called it ‘the hour of Europe’ (Howorth, 2014:74). Europe’s 
security policy and its militaries were not equipped to stop the conflict, however, and 
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eventually it had to be resolved via the US and NATO’s military hard power in 1995 
(Howorth, 2014:6; Nugent, 2010: 380). The Yugoslavian case showed the need for an 
integrated military arm for the CFSP, as hard military power seemed occasionally necessary 
to put an end to conflict. The failure of the EU to stop the fighting in the Balkans showed that 
it was not (yet) able to perform the security tasks it had envisioned. This was especially due to 
the fact that the EU’s security policy did not have an adequate mechanism for deploying hard 
power.  
 
However with respect to the failure of resolving the Yugoslav conflict the EU had already 
envisioned the need for an integrated military arm for the CFSP and that ambition was 
announced in the treaty of Maastricht and laid out in the so-called Peterberg declaration in 
1992 (Nugent, 2010: 380). The EU envisioned West European Union (WEU) to become the 
military organisation for EU’s foreign policy; however, this meant changing the operational 
role of the WEU (Larive, 2014: 61). The WEU was created during the Cold War to improve 
Europe’s self-defence but institutionally remained strictly intergovernmental and completely 
subordinate to NATO. (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014: 41). The new Peterberg tasks changed 
the operational role and responsibilities of the WEU, which, besides the common (territorial) 
defence, now also would include humanitarian interventions, peacekeeping missions, crisis 
management and peace-making (Larive, 2014). Article J 4.2 of the Maastricht treaty linked 
the EU to the WEU and it became the organisation for the EU’s defence aspirations. (Biscop, 
2016: 4–9; Aybet, 2000: 85). However, the member states could not agree on whether the 
Peterberg tasks would also result in a permanent structure and a European military force for 
the WEU because of the WEU’s close relationship to NATO. Some more Atlanticist member 
states were afraid this would undermine NATO. When, in 1997, the EU sought to merge the 
WEU with the EU to make it a EU defence organisation tied with NATO, this was vetoed by 
the UK (Howorth, 2014:7). The fact that the CFSP was without a military force and hard 
power to respond more effectively to a security challenges such as Yugoslavia was the result 
of the institutional weakness of the intergovernmental decision-making system, in this case 
veto power that prevented the creation of a (potential) capable EU military force. This is 
evidence of an institutional obstacle to security.  
 
As a result of the UK’s veto, the EU needed a new solution for the CFSP’s military hard 
power problem. With the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) NATO offered this 
solution. The Atlantic Council had already created the European Security and Defence 
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Identity (ESDI) in 1994, which sought to increase military cooperation between European 
countries by providing larger contributions from the European NATO countries during 
military operations (Nugent, 2010: 381). Expanding the ESDI would allow the EU to access 
essential assets from NATO (in reality, borrow them from the US) that they lacked. In terms 
of organisation, it meant that the ESDI would provide the EU countries access to NATO 
frameworks and launch missions on the condition that it was a European-only force and 
European-only command structure (Larive, 2014: 61). The West European Union would carry 
this out and function as the bridge between NATO and the EU, but not as a separate EU 
defence organisation. This would therefore mean that the CFSP remained without an 
integrated military arm to respond to security crises. Negotiations in Berlin from 1996 on by 
the NATO countries’ defence minister, which would become known as the ‘Berlin Plus 
agreement’, discussed the broad outlines of the procedures for allowing EU access to NATO.  
 
 Nevertheless, the ESDI arrangements did not provide the EU with adequate military hard 
power for security (missions) due to institutional problems. First there was disagreement 
between the EU and US on when the EU could use NATO’s structures and when they could 
borrow the crucial military capabilities from NATO and when they had to return them 
(Howorth, 2014: 6). This resulted in the fact that very few missions were launched via the 
ESDI (Howorth, 2014: 75-77). Second if such arrangements could be made and a mission was 
launched the WEU was politically too weak to assume responsibility for political oversight of 
EU missions, and due to its intergovernmental decision-making structure, it became 
institutionally unmanageable to carry out major military responsibilities (Howorth, 2014:6). 
Despite the fact that the ESDI arrangements remained unsatisfying and therefore it limited the 
EU’s hard power capabilities the debate on improving it remained unaddressed by the 
member states because on paper the EU’s security and defence policy had military 
capabilities through the ESDI (Howorth, 2014:77). Since the EU’s security and defence 
policy was not tested the institutional weaknesses remained unexposed. The fact that 
institutional weaknesses could become an obstacle to the EU’s security again would become 
clear with a geopolitical security event that occurred in 1998.   
 
The Kosovo war of 1998–99 directly showed the institutional flaws in the EU’s security 
defence policy. Despite the fact that the European countries had a collective budget of 230 
billion dollars and 1.5 million men and woman in arms, they did not possess the military 
capacity or mechanisms to send 40,000–50,000 troops into Kosovo to stop the Yugoslavian 
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army from committing its atrocities (Biscop, 2016: 8). This failure created a new attitude 
towards institutionalising Europe’s defence capabilities. Without US and NATO support, the 
European countries would not have been able to stop the second crisis in its vicinity. Despite 
the fact that the ESDI had been established for precisely this purpose, it never functioned 
institutionally in the way that policymakers had envisioned. This shows how institutional 
weaknesses can create an obstacle to the EU’s security again.  
  
To conclude, the CFSP’s institutional obstacles can be described as follows: The CFSP was 
equipped to perform various security tasks but had no military (institutional) arm to enforce 
them. Its intergovernmental decision-making system—and the fact that one member state (in 
this case, the UK) could use its veto power to stop a decision—meant that the WEU did not 
become Europe’s defence organisation with military hard power capable of launching security 
and stabilization missions. This institutional obstacle was also experienced during the Cold 
War, when France vetoed the EDC; a continuity in institutional obstacles has therefore existed 
in the EU’s security and defence policy area. The consequence was that the EU could not 
respond to or solve security crises effectively without the help of the US and NATO.    
 
The WEU’s institutional obstacle can be described thus: The fact that the WEU was 
dependent on NATO and the US had to provide the EU’s security and defence policy with 
hard power (via the ESDI) made it ineffective as a EU defence organisation. This was mainly 
because the EU and US could not agree on the terms for the use of hard power. As a 
consequence, the EU was unable to respond to the Kosovo crisis without the help of the US, 
which made it an institutional obstacle to security and its security and defence policy. This 
failure did, however, create political will to improve the EU’s security and defence policy. 
3.1.3 Institutional obstacles to the first European defence organisations 
The idea of improving Europe’s defence policy and equipping it with a common and coherent 
European defence organisation was revitalized in 1998 with the declaration of Saint-Malo. In 
Saint-Malo, France and the UK committed themselves to the creation of a European security 
and defence policy, which was remarkable because the UK had refused to do this with the 
WEU (Nugent, 2010: 381). The Saint-Malo declaration announced three defence ambitions 
for the EU, which for decades the EU countries had not been able to agree upon. The Saint-
Malo declaration stated first that the European Union should have the capacity for 
‘autonomous action’ (also called strategic autonomy), meaning to undertake military action 
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without the help of the US and NATO. Second, the EU ‘must be given appropriate structures 
to take decisions and implement them’, meaning the creation of an institutional framework to 
cooperate in defence. Third, it called for ‘credible military forces with the means to use them’, 
meaning the building of more European military hard power (Howorth, 2014:8).  
 
The declaration of Saint-Malo sparked the creation of the ESDP in 1999 via the treaty of 
Amsterdam (Howorth, 2014:36). The ESDP was the name of the European defence policy 
before it became know as the CSDP after the institutional change of the Lisbon treaty. For the 
sake of simplicity this thesis will refer to both the ESDP and the CSDP as the CSDP since 
they are two sides of the same coin. The CSDP changed the nature of the CSFP, which now 
had a framework to effectively pool national resources together and place ‘boots on the 
ground’, allowing it to play a more important role as a global security actor and thus 
effectively limiting the necessity of the ESDI. The European Union had created the necessary 
EU institutional framework for cooperating and managing the CSDP, although the decision-
making structure remained intergovernmental. The CSDP had acquired access to military 
assets of NATO via, among others, the Berlin Plus agreement. This allowed the EU to take 
over the NATO operation in Macedonia and two other civilian missions in the Western 
Balkans, as well as launch a military stabilization operation in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. These effectively became the first missions under a EU flag (Biscop, 2016: 16). 
However this meant that the CSDP was tied in with NATO’s framework, which hindered the 
idea of strategic autonomy envisioned at St Malo.  
 
Nevertheless, the EU still needed NATO and its military hard power, especially for Europe’s 
territorial defence, and most member states still valued the alliance that had secured them 
during the Cold War. Negotiations thus continued between NATO and the EU. The Berlin 
Plus agreements were finalised in 2002 and, in practise, would arrange the division of labour 
for Europe’s security. NATO would remain the organisation for the EU’s territorial defence 
and the EU’ CSDP would act as a low-intensity security actor in the region (Nugent, 2010: 
383; Riekeles, 2016:15).  
 
The European Union could now play the role of a security actor in line with the strategic 
thinking it had developed since the end of the Cold War: The EU’s military hard power would 
be used as ‘a force of good’ by launching stabilization and security missions to intervene in 
the internal affairs of sovereign states in order to safeguard human rights and not to pursue 
	 15	
national interests. This so-called ‘just war’ theory (Walzer, 2000) has dominated the strategic 
thinking in the EU’s security and politics. From January 2003 to today, the EU has launched 
35 overseas missions under its CSDP, of which 17 are ongoing and 18 are completed (EEAS, 
2018, May 03). These missions were a combination of military and civilian missions and 
operations (EEAS, 2018, 3 May) with the goal of intervening abroad both for the Union’s 
own security and to play a global role as security actor. Most of the EU’s missions have been 
launched in the Eastern border region and the Middle East and Sahel region (MENA region) 
(EEAS, 2018, 3 May). As a result, what has emerged since 2003 is a definable EU strategic 
security culture that combines (or at least attempts to combine) hard and soft power elements 
(Biscop, 2016: 30). Territorial defence, however, did not become a strategic topic for the 
EU’s security and defence policy, because this was assigned to NATO. 
 
Besides sparking the creation of the CSDP, Saint-Malo explicitly described the need to ‘forge 
a strong and competitive European defence industry and technology’, which led to the 
rethinking of pooling and sharing (P&S) military resources in order to create greater gains in 
defence capability development (Howorth, 2014: 24). Despite the fact that the European 
governments spend two thirds as much on defence as the USA they could only deploy 10 per 
cent as many troops (Nugent, 2010: 381). This meant that joint defence spending and 
capability developments could improve the EU’s capabilities and would be financial 
beneficial for all member states. The European Defence Agency (EDA) was created in 2003 
to improve the coordination of procurement and armament cooperation, which was the 
consequence of the accelerating reality of the CSDP’s ambitions and the associated need to 
link capabilities to armament production. The EDA would identify military capability 
objectives and make recommendations to EU countries for multilateral projects to fulfil these 
objectives; furthermore, the EDA would support defence technology research and, if 
necessary, support strengthening this research. States could voluntarily choose to join the 
EDA, however, and when they joined were in no way obligated to comply with its 
recommendations. The EDA remained a strictly intergovernmental institution (Howorth, 
2014: 91–96).   
 
Despite all of the high expectations regarding the CSDP and EDA, the reality of what the 
EU’s security and defence policy area achieved since 2003 in capability development and as 
security actor was far less impressive than it looked on paper, this is referred to as the 
‘capabilities-expectations gap’ (Hill, 1993), and was mainly the result of the CSDP’s and 
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EDA’s weak institutional structure. Member states continue to have different (strategic) 
visions on how far defence cooperation should go and when and how to launch an EU mission 
(Biscop, 2016:9). This difference in strategic vision proved to be an institutional obstacle 
since an outcome of this was that not a CSDP mission was launched but instead an EU 
mission consisting of a coalition of the willing, that relied on the US’s assistance. The fact 
that the (financial) benefits of creating military hard power through the EDA’s institutional 
framework were hardly used was due to a lack of ‘political will’ by the member states. The 
member states did not see the importance of improving the availability, mobility and 
deployability of forces, the interoperability of equipment and the procurement of joint defence 
capabilities through the EDA. All this was meant to improve the EU’s security and defence 
policy to be able to embark on a major military campaign but the EU member states were not 
willing to do this without NATO (i.e. the US) (Nugent, 2010: 386). Instead the member states 
focused the attention of their armed forces on participating in (international) security 
missions, which required them to possess less hard power and they could cut back on defence 
spending because they relied on NATO (i.e. the US) for key military hard power resources. 
Next to a lack of ‘political will’ the fact that complying with the EDA was not legally binding 
and no incentives to cooperation were given led to the fact that the member states did not use 
the potential of P&S. At the time the institutional weaknesses of the EU’s security and 
defence policy were not pointed out because the policy was not confronted with a large 
security crisis.    
 
To conclude, the institutional obstacle to the CSDP and EDA can be described as follows: 
Although the CSDP and the EDA were meant to improve Europe’s ability to launch security 
and stabilisation missions and develop military capabilities for its security and defence policy, 
the intergovernmental structure of both organisations meant that little was realised due to a 
lack of political will by the member states; Due to the intergovernmental decision-making 
system, member states in both institutions were in no way obligated to comply and could 
block CSDP decisions with a veto. The continuation of the institutional challenges 
experienced with the WEU and EDC was that member states did not have the ‘political will’ 
either to use the EU structures or to change them. The consequences were that the EU’s 
military hard power capacities remained limited and the member states relied on NATO (i.e. 
the US) for military hard power. 
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3.1.4 Institutional obstacles to recent European security and defence policy  
The Lisbon treaty of 2007 made 25 amendments in the field of the CFSP/CSDP. Relevant for 
this thesis’s analysis is that the member states agreed to restructure their militaries and 
defence budgets to professional deployable forces, which they pursued through capability 
development. This meant less focus on the territorial defence of the member states and more 
on (CSDP) missions. Regarding decision-making for CSDP missions, it was agreed that if 
unanimity cannot be reached, two or more states may go ahead with the mission provided that 
other member states do not object. This new mechanism of a core group in security and 
defence that could proceed without unanimity among member states was called Permanent 
Structured Cooperation (PESCO) (Howorth, 2014: 28). No thought was given, however, to 
how the new CSDP would interact with NATO (Howorth, 2014:143). 
 
In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, European countries cut back heavily on their 
military spending, which seriously harmed the military hard power of both NATO and the 
CSDP. Even in the wake of the financial crisis, the EDA’s financial potential was rarely used 
(Larive, 2014: 79). This consequently left the CSDP with a lack of military hard power 
capabilities. Along with the institutional limitations of the CSDP, this lack of military power 
would become evident during the Libyan crisis of 2011.  
 
Twenty years after the Yugoslavian wars, the EU was confronted with a new crisis in its 
vicinity, which would point out the institutional flaws of the CSDP and EDA. In 2011, the 
Libyan people, as well as some other North African populations, rose up against the 
dictatorships that had ruled them for decades. When the Libyan revolutionaries were on the 
verge of being crushed and a humanitarian disaster was looming, France and the UK decided 
to act. The Libyan situation was precisely the type of regional crisis management for which 
the CSDP had been designed. It shared similarities with the situation in Kosovo in 1999: the 
crisis occurred in the EU’s proximity and the US apparently did not wish to get involved. 
(Howorth, 2014:138).  
 
Germany, one of the larger military players in the EU, opposed intervening militarily into a 
sovereign nation, while another large military country, Poland, thought that Libya did not 
qualify as a possible CSDP mission because it did not fulfil the criteria under which a mission 
could be launched (Howorth, 2014:138). A CSDP mission could no longer be institutionally 
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blocked due to PESCO; nevertheless, with one large military player after another dropping 
out, France and the UK decided not to launch a CSDP mission but instead opted to form a 
coalition of the willing to intervene in Libya and impose a no-fly zone. It was estimated that 
ninety per cent of the mission had to be sustained with the US’s military help (Larive, 2014: 
96). The poor self-sustaining performance of the Europeans in Libya raised the following 
question: if the European countries did not possess the military capabilities to self-sustain a 
military intervention in Libya, how would they then be able to protect their territorial integrity 
vis-à-vis Russia, for example, without the help of the US (Larive, 2014:96)? 
 
The fact that France and the UK chose a ‘coalition of the willing’ over a CSDP mission shows 
the institutional infectivity in decision-making of the CSDP. The fact that, in terms of military 
hard power, the two largest military powers in the EU did not possess the military capabilities 
to implement the no-fly zone, and the US had to support its NATO allies showed the poor 
state of military hard power capabilities in the EU.   
 
Libya showed that not only did the EU not have the institutional capabilities to launch a 
military mission were a substantial amount of military hard power had to be used, they also 
did not posses these capabilities in the wake of the financial crisis. Even though the EDA was 
created for this as mentioned before the weak institutional format did not create ‘political 
will’ among the member states to use it, nor did the institutional format obligate the member 
states to comply with the EDA’s projects. This left the EU with a lack of military hard power 
and a lack of institutional capabilities to use it. This is more evidence of how institutional 
obstacles can become obstacles to the EU’s security.  
 
To summarise, the institutional obstacles to the CSDP and EDA post 2011 are as follows: The 
intergovernmental decision-making system of the CSDP, in which member states can opt out, 
has been shown to limit the effectiveness of the EU in responding to crises. Another drawback 
of this system was that due to the severity of the financial crisis, the member states neither 
prioritised military capability development to improve the CSDP’s military hard power nor 
used the benefits of P&S. As a consequence, the US was forced to pay for Europe’s security, 
as it has done in the past, and the Europeans could strategically ‘bandwagon1’ with the US’s 
military hard power (Matlary, 2018:217). This strategic reliance on NATO and unwillingness 																																																								1	When faced with a (regional) hegemon a strategy that could be pursued could be to military align itself with it, a process called 
‘bandwagoning’  (Mearsheimer, 2013: 83). 
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to use the EDA’s framework to substantially improve Europe’s defence is a continuation of 
the institutional obstacles of the 1990s.  
 
In conclusion, the recurring institutional obstacles to the EU’s security and defence policy 
are: 1) The intergovernmental decision-making structure and the veto power of member states 
in the defence institutions. This resulted in member states launching small- and medium-sized 
military missions but opting out of larger military missions where the use of military hard 
power was required, relying instead on NATO and US capabilities. 2) The voluntary 
institutional approach to military capability development, which resulted in EU member states 
not using the benefits of P&S to create military hard power because they chose to prioritize 
other policy areas. Since throughout the integration process, the member states did not have 
the political will to create military hard power or a more binding institutional framework to 
facilitate this, the EU seriously lacks military hard power capabilities. Consequently, with 
their current security and defence policy, the EU and its member states cannot adequately 
respond to a threat in their vicinity that poses an obstacle to the EU’s security and whose 
solution requires military hard power. Not only a lack of hard power but also an inadequate 
decision-making ability further hinders an effective response to such a security crisis. All this 
could potentially be the first piece of evidence that was found that would serve as a trigger for 
the EU to start new developments to change the EU’s security and defence policy.  
 
Despite these issues, Europe strategically relies on NATO’s military power for hard power 
security, which has created a lack of political will for the EU to rethink its security and 
defence policy. Two events that are analysed in the next section, however, could create 
political will and may offer new incentives for the Europeans to improve the EU’s 
institutional structure and rethink the development of EU military capability.  
 
3.2 The impact of Russia’s foreign policy on European security 
This chapter analyses how the RF’s assertive foreign policy has become the EU’s main 
geopolitical security obstacle and how this has sparked new developments in rethinking the 
EU’s security and defence policy.  
3.2.1 Russia’s threat perception to the EU 
 
	 20	
The 1997 and 1999 NATO enlargements and the 2004 and 2007 EU expansions brought the 
border of NATO and the EU directly to that of the RF; under NATO’s Article 5, the new 
European NATO countries now enjoyed protection of their territorial integrity from any 
(Russian) aggression. As NATO is not a supranational organisation, however, it depends on 
unanimity for decisions, as well as on some actors that are more important than others—none 
more so than the US (Matlary, 2018:214). Military protection via NATO is largely provided 
by the US, which covers more than 70 per cent of NATO’s total defence costs and is therefore 
the alliance’s major security guarantor (Matlary, 2018: 214). Most Central and Eastern 
European countries (particularly the Baltic states and Poland) thus have tended to see their 
relationships with the US (via NATO) as the surest passage to securing their future (De 
France & Witney, 2013: 4–8). With Article 42.7 of the 2007 Lisbon treaty, the EU also 
attempted to provide some military security, especially for its non-NATO members Finland 
and Sweden and, to a lesser extent, Austria, Ireland, Malta and Cyprus (since they are not in 
the Russian geo-proximity). 
 
The first (diplomatic) tensions between the EU/NATO and the RF became evident during the 
Russian-Georgian war in 2008. When, at the 2008 Bucharest Summit, it became clear that 
Georgia was aspiring to NATO membership, Russia immediately reacted with an attack on 
the so-called republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Cornell, 2017:17). The attack sent a 
clear message to NATO that it could not expand further into the vicinity of Russia without 
military response from the RF. As EU and NATO leaders did not want a military 
confrontation with Russia, this ended Georgian aspirations to NATO membership (Matlary, 
2018: 8). Russia’s actions in Georgia did not cause an immediate shock to the EU’s security 
mainly because the EU was not directly involved, but the hard military responds of Russia 
towards Georgian territory worried the EU and led to diplomatic tensions.  
 
However the next sequel of events did cause a shock to the EU’s security: When in late 2013 
Ukraine and four other former Soviet countries (Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan) 
were in the process of signing an economic trade agreement with the EU and although the 
agreements focused mainly on trade and did not offer any formal prospect of EU membership, 
it contributed to a closer relationship between the EU and the country that signs. In responds 
Russia stepped in with hard economic sanctions against the countries that were about to sign 
and this came as a shock to the EU (Matlary, 2018: 8). The message from Russia to these 
countries was clear: either join them or join us. This classic win-or-lose Realpolitik resulted in 
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Ukraine and Armenia dropping out of the negotiations (Matlary, 2018: 8; Cornell, 2017: 152). 
When in 2014 protests in Ukraine led to the ousting of the pro-Russian president Viktor 
Yanukovych and the new government signed the EU association agreement, Russia responded 
with the annexation of Crimea and military involvement in the Donbas region. In doing so, 
Russia showed that it is not afraid to deploy military hard power to achieve its strategic 
foreign policy goals (Matlary, 2018:9).  Russia’s hard economic sanctions but above all its 
military actions against Ukraine came as a shock to the EU, which for the first time was 
confronted with military action against a country that had expressed the will to have closer 
(economic) cooperation with the EU. Due to the RF’s aggressive foreign policy, the EU can 
no longer see Russia as a potential partner. Russia is not moving in the EU’s direction—with 
its actions in Ukraine, in fact, Russia directly opposes and threatens the EU (Matlary, 2018:4).  
 
With Russia’s actions against Ukraine, they became a geopolitical security obstacle to the EU. 
The European Union responded to Russia’s military action with economic sanctions targeting 
specific aspects of the Russian economy and targeted sanctions against 155 persons and 44 
entities (European Council, 2018, 13 September). Diplomatic relations with the RF are 
currently at an all-time low, resembling the period during the Cold War, with the risk of hard 
power being used in an actual war and the return of military tension and spheres of influence 
in world politics (Matlary, 2018: 9). The countries at the EU’s eastern border thus feel that 
their territorial integrity is directly threatened by Russia (Marocchi, 2017, 3 July). The EU’s 
security and defence policy (as well as the member states’ militaries), however, is not 
equipped to fight a war with the deployment of military hard power. Over the years—in order 
to save money and because they deemed hard power for territorial resilience unnecessary 
since the end of the Cold War—they have restructured their militaries to be able to undertake 
security and stabilization missions instead. With an adversary like Russia, the European 
countries are now being forced to rethink their security and defence policy in terms of 
military hard power that creates military deterrence to protect their territorial integrity, as was 
the case against the USSR during the Cold War (Matlary, 2018: 24). However military 
deterrence was a concept the EU and its member states have neglected since the end of the 
Cold War and left in the hands of the US and NATO.  
  
Russia’s military actions against Ukraine and increased military presence in the Baltic Sea led 
Sweden and Finland to increase their military spending and shift their position from neutrality 
towards more European defence cooperation, including joint exercises with NATO (Creton, 
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2018, 21 May). This rethinking has sparked action and led to new developments in the EU’s 
security and defence policy. It has created political will in the member states to rethink the 
EU’s security and defence policy and to take new measures that would make the EU and its 
member states better able to deter the RF (van Ham, 2018:14).  
 
In addition to the EU’s security concern towards the RF, NATO responded to Russia’s actions 
as well with the Wales 2014 and Warsaw 2016 security summits. In these summits several 
measures were taken to reinforce the Baltic States and Poland, the NATO countries that feel 
that their territorial security is most threatened by Russia (NATO, 2017, 28 August). This 
essentially solved the EU’s immediate security concerns as well.  
 
In conclusion, Russia’s aggressive foreign policy using hard power has created a geopolitical 
security obstacle for the EU. The European Union member states have thus been forced to 
rethink their defence policy in terms creating of military hard power for territorial security. 
The fact that the EU member states are forced to rethink their security and defence policy in 
terms of deployment of military hard power in light of this geopolitical security obstacle 
could be the next ‘piece of evidence’ that sparked new developments that affected the EU’s 
security and defence policy. However Europe strategically still relies on NATO’s military 
power for hard power security. The next section’s analysis could provide the last ‘piece of 
evidence’ that explains the start to new developments that affect the EU’s security and 
defence policy.  
 
3.3 The impact of the change in US foreign policy on the EU’s security 
This section analyses how the recent change in US foreign policy forms a strategic obstacle to 
the EU’s security. First, it analyses how this change influences the EU’s territorial security in 
light of its major geopolitical obstacle and second, how it affects the EU’s ability to respond 
to external crises through security missions in light of the institutional obstacle.  
3.3.1 The military spending imbalance debate 
The new Trump administration, which took office in January 2017, has taken a different 
approach to the NATO alliance than the previous Obama administration, placing a renewed 
emphasis on sovereignty and national interest. Trump has warned his allies around the world 
that the US can no longer be taken advantage of or join ‘deals’ in which the US receives little 
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in return (van Ham, 2018:2). Trump’s attention immediately went to NATO, and he pointed 
out a recurring topic within the alliance: the military spending imbalance between the US and 
most of its European allies, which is often seen as the most important point of friction within 
NATO. In IR theory, the military spending imbalance problem is referred to as ‘free-riding’. 
The fact that some NATO members spend less on their defence and therefore contribute less 
to NATO’s deterrence strategy—but still receive an equal amount of protection—has led to 
friction within the alliance (Russett, 2013: 111).  
 
Under the new Trump administration, however, the debate entered a new dimension. In his 
electoral campaign, he called NATO obsolete and openly questioned the Article 5 clause by 
stating that the NATO countries that did not meet NATO’s the self imposed 2 per cent 
spending norm did not deserve the US’s military protection (van Ham, 2018:12). In 2006 
NATO countries agreed to spend 2 per cent of their GDP on defence to uphold the alliances 
military strength, but at the time Trump was elected very few EU countries reached that norm 
(Bremmer, 2017, 24 February). In contrast the US spends over 3 per cent of its GDP on 
defence. Trump’s message to the US’s European NATO allies was clear: carry the burden of 
costs or risk abandonment in your own region (Matlary, 2018:4).  
3.3.2 The consequences of Trump’s foreign policy for the EU’s territorial security 
The new attitude of US foreign policy towards NATO, which is the consequence Trumps 
(new) foreign policy, creates a security obstacle for the EU in light of the Russian geopolitical 
security obstacle. The US, through NATO, provides the majority of military hard power for 
most of the EU’s territory, and it can be assumed that the alliance when including the US has 
enough military capabilities to deter the RF (AIV, 2017:18). Although the RF most likely 
does not have the intention of waging a long-term war with NATO/EU, it may be tempted to 
commit a ‘fait accompli’ by infringing upon the Baltic states because it feels it must secure its 
interests (by securing access to Kaliningrad or protecting the Russian speaking minority, for 
example) and because they think they can (AIV, 2017: 18).  
 
As a result of US pressure, the countries that feel the most threatened by Russia’s actions (the 
Baltic states and Poland) have increased their military spending in order to reach the 
alliance’s 2 per cent norm in 2018 (van Ham, 2018: 13-14). Although most European NATO 
members still do not meet the 2 per cent spending norm, the trend of the 2014, 2016 and 2018 
NATO summits was that the European NATO leaders pledged to spend more on their 
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defence. The fact that Trump is critical towards NATO, however, does not mean that the US 
is leaving the alliance (Zandee, 2018, 26 November). The Trump administration has adopted 
several measures to reassure its NATO allies and taken a firm stance against any possible 
Russian aggression at the Eastern border of Europe, even increasing the US’s military 
presence in Europe (van Ham, 2018: 13–14).  
 
Nevertheless, Trump’s style of leadership is highly capricious. The President requested the 
Pentagon to investigate the withdraw of 35,000 US troops out of Europe (NOS, 2018, 30 
June) and his unilateral decision to pull US troops out of Syria without consulting his 
secretary of defence or his allies shows the president takes the decisions of US foreign policy 
more and more on his own (Person, 2018, 21 December). This could potentially be dangerous 
for NATO because Trump seems to have devoted his foreign policy goals towards NATO into 
making the Europeans comply with the 2 per cent spending norm in order to ‘deliver a good 
deal’ for the US’s foreign policy. The European must therefore invest in their defence if they 
wish to keep unconditional US military support in NATO via Article 5 (van Ham, 2018: 25) 
and this creates a strategic obstacle to the EU’s security. 
 
3.3.3 The impact of Trump’s foreign policy for EU military missions 
President Trump has a different view on international security than the EU and previous US 
administrations. With his ‘America First’ policy and a focus on renegotiating international 
treaties, Trump put renewed emphasis on sovereignty and national interest. By withdrawing 
the US from the several international treaties and the Iran deal Trump translated his words 
into action (Borger, 2018), indicating that he no longer wants the US to be the global 
hegemon that supports the global institutions and the international order. The (suspected) 
decline of the so-called ‘Pax Americana’ is likely to cause the end of the (liberal) world order 
the US has created since the end of the Second World War, a trend that was already visible 
during the 1990s and 2000s.  
 
It thus seems less likely that the US will be willing to aid the Europeans with costly military 
hard power when they launch a military security mission, especially when it is not in the US’s 
direct interest (as in the cases of Yugoslavia, Kosovo and Libya). If the European states want 
to be able to carry out security and stabilization missions to secure their own vicinity, they 
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would have to contribute more to this through their own security and defence policy and 
create the ‘strategic autonomy’ from the US that was envisioned earlier.  
 
In conclusion, Trump’s remarks and actions have meant that the EU can no longer rely on 
NATO for military hard power, which creates a strategic obstacle. Consequently, since 
military hard power through NATO (i.e. the US) for the security of Europe is not as certain as 
it was in the past the Europeans will need to provide more military hard power for their own 
security. This in combination with the institutional and geopolitical security obstacles seem to 
be the factors that caused the EU to rethink their security and defence policy and start new 
developments that affected that policy area. However the next section will analyse if this 
might be the case.  
 
3.4 New developments in the EU’s security and defence policy 
This chapter analyses the EU’s response to the security obstacles, by analysing the proposals 
the EU has put forth to improve its security and defence policy and how the member states 
reacted to these proposals. The EU put forth new initiatives to improve the area of capability 
development and the launch of CSDP missions of its security and defence policy. This chapter 
will show the measures that have recently been implemented and how they led to new 
developments in the EU’s security and defence policy.  
3.4.1 EU and member state responses to institutional, geopolitical and strategic obstacles 
In 2016, the EU launched its European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) document. The fact 
that 13 years had passed since the previous strategy document in security policy and defence 
was launched shows that the EU (and its member states) did not deem it to be of the highest 
importance for the Union. Meanwhile, the fact that NATO strategy documents were updated 
much more frequently shows the division of labour between the two organisations with regard 
to Europe’s security (Matlary, 2018: 219). In the reflection paper that followed in 2017 the 
European Commission stated its wish to improve the CSDP and the military capabilities of 
the member states by creating more military hard power together with the member states.  
 
The European Union wants to create and build more military hard power through the 
deepening of cooperation and P&S of resources. They intend to equip the member states with 
the technological and industrial means to create military hard power while retaining their 
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autonomy. This deepening should lead to interoperability, effectiveness and trust between the 
member states for development (EUGS, 2016: 20). As a result of its recent obstacles to 
security, the EU is attempting to capture the current strategic momentum to enhance on P&S 
by creating a new institutional framework. This new institutional framework should create 
‘real’ commitments from the member states to make EU defence cooperation the norm rather 
than the exception (EUGS, 2016: 45). An institutional obstacle faced with the EDA.  
 
In 2016, the European Commission proposed the European Defence Action Plan (EDAP). 
The EDAP announced the future financing of defence research by the Union’s budget and 
offered financial incentives for the capability program (stimulation of defence capabilities). 
Also in 2016, the Commission proposed the European Defence Fund (EDF), which was 
established in 2017. The EDF can be seen as a further elaboration on the financial proposal of 
the EDAP. The Commission’s goal was to give a boast to cooperative defence projects and 
defence spending, anticipating the emergence of the PESCO institutional format through 
which the member states could cooperate (Zandee, 2017:5). With the new development of the 
EDF the Commission wants to play a role in developing EU military capabilities by offering 
financial incentives to the member states in response to the institutional obstacle experienced 
during the EDA.  
 
In their 2017 reflection paper on the future of EU defence, the Commission outlined the 
differences in defence procurement, defence spending and defence armament between the EU 
and the US. Their aim was to make an important contribution to the debate on the fact that 
joint European defence spending can be much more effective and beneficial. In the reflection 
paper, the Commission outlined its plan for a new institutional setup and stressed that it is 
willing to provide the adequate framework and incentives for EU countries to develop and 
maintain more and better defence capabilities (European Commission, 2017: 6). The 
Commission therefore asked the member states how far they wish to go in terms of an 
institutional framework in joint defence spending and procurement for developing defence 
capabilities and a format for future CSDP missions.  
 
The three proposals for a new institutional format put forward by the Commission (2017:12-
15) were:   
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A. Security and Defence Cooperation: Member states decide on the need for security 
and defence cooperation on a voluntary and case-by-case basis, while the EU 
continues to complement national efforts (intergovernmental) 
B. Shared Security and Defence: Member states pool together certain financial and 
operational assets to increase solidarity in defence. The EU becomes more engaged in 
Europe's protection within and beyond its borders (low degree of supranationalism) 
C. Common Defence and Security: This scenario is the most far-reaching and foresees 
the progressive framing of a common defence union, leading to a common defence 
based on Article 42 of the EU treaty (supranational) 
 
These three proposals were not mutually exclusive, but illustrate three different levels of 
ambition in terms of solidarity. The member states reached an agreement on the new 
institutional format on 13 November 2018. The agreement was a combination out of the three 
proposals from the reflection paper and is known as the PESCO agreement. This new 
development was a direct responds of the Commission to the institutional obstacles 
experienced with the EDA and CSDP. 
 
On 13 September 2017, the defence and foreign ministers of 23 EU member states signed the 
common notification on the PESCO agreement (with Ireland and Portugal joining soon after). 
In total, 25 out of 28 EU member states joined the PESCO agreement, with Denmark, the UK 
and Malta opting out (EEAS, 2018, 22 June). With PESCO the member states have agreed to 
undertake legally binding measures to improve their defence capabilities, as well as proposals 
on the (institutional) governance of PESCO (EEAS, 2018, 22 June).  
 
In terms of developing defence capabilities, the member states agreed to commitments on 
joint defence spending, joint procurement and joint development of military equipment and 
improved military mobility (van Slooten, 2017, 13 November). These measures should 
directly enable the EU member states to improve their military capabilities and improve 
Europe’s infrastructure to be better suitable for military transport in light of its security 
obstacles. On 11th of December 2017, the European Council adopted a decision establishing 
PESCO and its list of participants. The member states agreed upon legally binding projects in 
the area of capability development and in the operational dimension (EEAS, 2018, 22 June).  
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However the decision to join and/or launch a CSDP mission will remain the sole competence 
of the member state. Member states can join on a voluntary basis, missions will be created on 
an ad hoc basis and none of them will be inclusive (van Slooten, 2017, 13 November). This is 
means that not that much would change to the institutional decision making format of the 
CSDP, which was perceived as a institutional obstacle to security because effective decision 
making has hindered the launch of CSDP mission in the past. However a group of 10 EU 
member states responded to this by launching the European Intervention Initiative (EI2) 
outside the EU’s security and defence policy. Despite the fact that it falls outside the treaty, it 
still has consequences for the EU’s security and for its defence policy, which will be argued 
in the next section.  
 
With regard to PESCO’s institutional framework outlined in the reflection paper: In terms of 
joint capability development and operational development, the member states have chosen 
proposal B, shared responsibility. In terms of the launch of a CSDP mission, they chose 
option A, which means it remains strongly intergovernmental and firmly in the hands of the 
member states.  
 
The fact that the EU and its member states agreed upon new proposals which should improve 
the institutional format of the EU’s security and defence policy in the area of capability 
development to create military capabilities (hard power) and a new institutional format to 
improve the EU’s ability to launch a security mission shows that the institutional, geopolitical 
and strategic obstacles led to new developments. Member states felt threatened in their 
security due to the geopolitical and strategic obstacles and agreed that creating more military 
hard power seemed to be the answer to these obstacles. This explain why the member states 
now had the ‘political will’ to change the institutional format of the EU’s security and defence 
policy.   
 
3.5 The effect of the new developments on the EU’s security and defence policy 
This chapter analyses how these new developments affect the EU’s security and defence 
policy, both the EU’s ability to develop military capabilities as well as its ability to undertake 
military (CSDP) missions in light of the previously analysed security obstacles. It first 
analyses how the policy has been adjusted to create more military capability and second, how 
it will affect the EU’s ability to undertake security missions.  
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3.5.1 Improving the EU’s capability development for military hard power 
The three main new initiatives that have currently been launched to solve the EU’s military 
hard power problems in response to its security obstacles are PESCO, the EDF and the 
Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD). All of these are self-standing initiatives but 
(are intended to be) coordinated together (EEAS, 2017, 20 October). The Coordinated Annual 
Review on Defence is the voluntary review of the respective national defence plans and is to 
feed into the identification of cooperation projects to be pursued through PESCO, which 
should be financed through the EDF (EEAS, 2017, 20 October).  
 
Based on my research, a lack of ‘political will’ in the past resulted in no military hard power 
being developed by the EU member states. With the EDF, the Commission is attempting to 
enhance political will in the member states to develop and continue to develop military hard 
power by offering financial incentives. The EDF consists of two complementary windows, the 
research window and capability window. The Commission tries to help the member states in 
the research window by funding defence research with 90 million Euros and between 2017–
19 and for 500 million Euros during the next multi-annual financial framework period (2021-
2027) (Zandee, 2017:7). In the capability window the EU funds defence research and helps 
the member states move past the so-called sensitive phase of a defence project. In this 
window the Commission has decided to co-finance the development of defence capabilities 
with 500 million Euros in 2019–20, and for a European defence industrial development 
programme (EDIDP) it will offer 1 billion Euros post-2020. This money is used to stimulate 
European defence development by co-financing defence development projects in addition to 
the member states’ budgets. Also in the capability window, the Commission is offering 
financial incentives to the member states to support their investment in collaborative 
procurement programmes (Zandee, 2017:8). This should ensure that the member states remain 
committed to creating the military hard power to create ‘strategic autonomy’ and deter the 
RF’s military.  
 
Another institutional obstacle that prevented the development of military capabilities in the 
EU context was its voluntary approach. With PESCO, the EU aims to improve the defence 
capabilities of the European member states through structured cooperation and by pooling 
their resources (EEAS, 2018, 22 June). The member states enter into a jurisdictional binding 
contract and compliance is reviewed every year. In case of compliance violation, a ‘yellow 
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card’ is issued, which means that countries must make improvements quickly or risk sanctions 
(De Boer, 2017, 11 December). This legally binding concept makes PESCO institutionally 
more far-reaching than any prior form of EU defence cooperation. The member states are not 
obligated to join all PESCO projects but can join on a voluntary basis; as soon as they have 
signed up for participation in the project, however, it becomes legally binding (De Boer, 
2017, 11 December). Countries may prevent other countries from participating in one of the 
projects if they cannot deliver adequate input or their input is of insufficient quality, but this is 
done in order to safeguard the quality of the end product and prevent ‘free-riding’ (de Boer, 
2017, 11 December). This new legally binding concept of defence project should make 
PESCO institutionally better able to ensure progress in capability development.  
 
A further institutional obstacle identified in this research is the fact that different military 
strategic cultures hindered the joint development of military capabilities by the member 
states. PESCO aims to create a European strategic culture of cooperating in the field of 
security and defence to enhance further integration and strengthen defence cooperation within 
the EU framework, thus strengthening the EU’s security and defence policy. On June 28, the 
new 2018 EU capability plan was approved by the member states. The revised 2018 
Capability Development Plan (CDP), in reaction to the 2016 EDAP, has been developed in 
the framework of the EDA and in close cooperation with member states and the EU Military 
Committee and EU military staff. It will serve as a guiding reference for any related initiatives 
taken by member states or the EU. In this way, the new plan and priorities will contribute to 
achieving greater coherence and faster results when developing the European defence project 
(i.e. the creation of hard power; EEAS, 2018, 2 July). The CDP aims to provide a full picture 
of the current state of affairs regarding military capability development, contributing to 
increased coherence between member state defence planning and thus serving as a basis for 
the decision-making process at both the EU and national levels. Furthermore, it addresses 
security and defence challenges from the perspective of European capability development, 
looks at the future operational environment and defines EU capability development priorities 
as agreed upon by member states (EEAS, 2018, 2 July). This coordination should create 
greater coherence in capability development in the EU’s security and defence policy.  
 
My research findings show that the EU’s security and defence policy neither possessed nor 
developed the military hard power to launch large military security missions or create 
territorial resilience against geopolitical threats at the border, nor did it deem territorial 
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resilience necessary. With PESCO, the EU hopes to improve the military capacity of its 
security and defence policy to act as an international security partner for the ‘protection of 
citizens’ (EEAS, 2018, 22 June). This means (among other things) giving a larger 
contribution to deterring external geopolitical threats such as the RF and spill-over effects 
from conflicts in its vicinity (MENA region). This hard power is created by maximising the 
effectiveness of mutual defence spending between the member states (EEAS, 2018, 22 June).  
 
To summarise: The new developments PESCO, EDF and CARD should improve the 
institutional format of the EU’s security and defence policy. First, PESCO creates a coalition-
type mechanism for decision-making, which means it develops a framework in which clusters 
between members can be formed. In this way, it attempts to tackle the institutional obstacles 
of the past and move beyond the limitations of intergovernmentalism without having to create 
a supranational structure; member states that wish to go further in terms of cooperation in 
security and defence issues may create a sub-group (coalition). Member states can now decide 
the level of ambition at which they would like to participate. As a result, this has already led 
to more capability projects being launched and joined by different member states; projects 
such as the Military Mobility project are directly aimed at making Europe better able to 
respond to any hostilities from the RF at the eastern border.    
 
Second, when a member state decides to join a PESCO project, it is legally binding and there 
are consequences to a lack of compliance. Consequently, PESCO aims to ensure that member 
states remain committed to the project and continue to develop military capabilities to 
improve the Union’s hard power capabilities and create strategic autonomy.  
 
Third, for the first time, the European Commission has become a player in security and 
defence policy, offering the member states financial incentives to cooperate in joint capability 
development. Consequently, the EU is attempting to create the ‘political will’ for the member 
states to cooperate and improve their military hard power capabilities. This is in itself 
remarkable because in all previous cooperation forms, the EU member states attempted to 
keep the Commission at arm’s length (Howorth, 2017:4).  
 
If implemented correctly, these initiatives could create the necessary framework and 
incentives to develop military hard power and improve the EU’s security and defence policy 
to be able to better overcome its geopolitical and strategic obstacles.  
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3.5.2 Improving Europe’s intervention capabilities 
Based on my research, it can be concluded that the EU’s security and defence policy was 
ineffective as a security actor when deployment of military hard power was required as a 
result of ineffective decision-making and lack of strategic coherence among the member 
states. PESCO aims to increase the member states’ effectiveness in dealing with common 
security challenges and hopes to create a European strategic culture of cooperating in the field 
of security and defence that will facilitate future EU missions. As the decision to join will 
remain on a voluntary basis and is not legally binding for the member states, it remains 
unclear in what way PESCO improves the CSDP; therefore, PESCO mainly seems to develop 
European military hard power with no plan for using it (Howorth, 2017:9–12). 
 
In response to the lack in ambition of the member states with regard to the new CSDP 
cooperation format of PESCO, on June 25th 2018, a group of EU countries led by France 
signed a new European initiative in terms of European military interventions. During 
negotiations regarding the institutional shape of PESCO for future CSDP missions, France 
favoured a strong Common Defence Union (option C) with an EU that would be able to run 
high-end security and defence operations via its CSDP. France wanted the EU to be able to 
carry out stabilisation missions in its neighbourhood and in the MENA region in particular. 
This because it is where most instability occurs, which posses a threat to the EU’s security, 
but also were France’s strategic interests are. Germany and many of the eastern EU members, 
however, wanted PESCO to focus more on territorial resilience than high-end security 
operations abroad, and binding commitments in this policy area were deemed a bridge too far 
(van Slooten, 2017, 13 November). Despite this, France (together with Germany) created the 
momentum to accelerate Europe’s intervention capabilities now that the transatlantic 
relationship is under pressure. 
 
On June the 28th, 2018, nine EU countries joined forces and signed the European Intervention 
Initiative (EI2)2. Particularly remarkable was the fact that two non-PESCO EU members, the 
UK and Denmark, signed the initiative along with France, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, 
Spain, Portugal and Estonia (with Finland to join on November 4, 2018; Ministre des Armes, 
2018). The UK’s signing of the agreement demonstrates its commitment to continue playing a 
role in Europe’s security despite its exit from the Union. In the initiative, the 10 nations have 																																																								2	Not to confused with the E2I, which is a german initiatives anchoured in the CSDP to support local actors to solve local conflicts.  
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agreed to pull together their forces and resources in order to quickly respond with capable 
military force when crises arise at the European outer border, for instance the MENA region 
(Leijten, 2018, 25 June). The fact that the 10 countries have agreed on a common vision and 
commitments for future missions is a major step forward and precisely what made the CSDP 
less effective as a security actor (along with its lack of military capabilities to launch the 
intervention).  
 
The EI2 is not part of PESCO nor is it part of the EU’s security and defence policy. France is 
clearly in the lead in sharing and offering its military structures for intervention, and the 
initiative has been criticised that since the initiatives relies on France’s military structures its 
allowed to dominate European security politics in light of NATO’s retreat (Witney, 2018, 22 
May).  
 
Nevertheless, the EI2 still has relevance for the EU’s security and defence policy because, as 
the EU’s largest military player, France is taking the responsibility for creating a European 
strategic culture of intervention and security mission, which the EU has been attempting to 
achieve since the launch of the CFSP. The fact that the EI2 is not part of the PESCO 
agreement meant that the (two Atlanticists) UK and Denmark could join, thus contributing to 
the strategic culture and (not unimportant) making the UK’s military capabilities available. 
The coordinated planning of EI2 makes it more likely that the Europeans will have a better 
response in crises such as Libya without having to fall back on NATO (Witney, 2018, 22 
May). Furthermore, the EI2 is intended to seek synergy with PESCO; for instance, during 
collective exercises or military missions are (launched via the EI2), it might be possible that 
limitations to the military capabilities of the 10 EU countries are discovered. These military 
capabilities deficiencies discovered can fed into CARD and be pursued through PESCO. In 
turn, EI2 will benefit if PESCO projects bear fruit (Witney, 2018, 22 May).  
 
The EI2 could be a first step to a EU-wide strategic culture in European defence, especially 
now that the Atlanticists and the neutrals are looking more towards the EU for security. This 
means that the EI2 may one day seek closer cooperation with PESCO. For now the fact that 
the EI2 countries are planning and coordinating an intervention force together should enable 
the EU to undertake military missions better without having to call upon the US for aid. 
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The inability in decision-making to launch military missions in combination with a lack of 
political will to create military hard power through P&S proved to be institutional obstacles to 
the EU’s security. This alone would seemingly not have been enough for the EU member 
states to change the (institutional framework) EU’s security and defense policy. However in 
light of the Russian threat that posses an geopolitical security obstacle and requires an 
substantial amount of military hard power to be deterred, in combination with the fact that the 
US’s military hard power for the protection of Europe is not as unconditional as it was in the 
past and will require more European contribution, altogether provide a minimal explanatory 
outcome for the fact that the EU and the member states decided to start new developments 
that affected the EU’s security and defence policy. These new developments affect the EU’s 
security and defence policy to make it institutionally better able to create military hard power 
through PESCO, EDF and CARD and launch military missions through the EI2 format.   
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4 Discussion: Expectations for the effect of new developments on the EU’s security 
and defence policy  
In light of the main analytical research of this thesis, this chapter discusses how the new 
developments (PESCO, EDF, CARD and EI2) might affect the EU’s security and defence 
policy.   
 
The Permanent Structured Cooperation Agreement should help to create coherence and a 
strategic culture in European defence. Together with the EI2, PESCO may transform the EU’s 
security and defence policy into an EU security and defence union that can secure its own 
neighbourhood and has credible military deterrence against its territorial threats with strategic 
autonomy form the US, as envisioned by the Commission.  
 
Institutionally, however, any decisions to further integrate and transform the EU’s security 
and defence policy will always be made intergovernmentally. Although PESCO is legally 
binding, the decision to join a project remains intergovernmental. The institutional pitfall of 
most prior EU security and defence organisations (particularly the EDA and CSDP) was that 
they appeared impressive on paper but did not realise very much due to an intergovernmental 
decision-making system and a lack of political will (the capabilities-expectations gap). Thus, 
PESCO’s success will depend on the political will of the member states.   
 
Geopolitical and strategic crises have often been the best conditions for rethinking and further 
integrating the EU’s security and defence policy. The current geopolitical threat from Russia 
in combination with the new US foreign policy has led to new (strategic) thinking in the EU 
regarding its security and defence policy. When new developments are underway, member 
states cannot afford to be left out of its institutional framework and will join in order to 
maximise their security. This explains why the Baltic States and Poland still joined PESCO 
despite the fact that since they reach the 2% norm they most likely are secured form US hard 
power against Russia. This ‘path dependency effect’ could push member states to commit to 
making progress, which would transform PESCO and the EI2 into a successful European 
security union.  
 
Critics will note, however, that the fact that three EU countries have opted out of PESCO 
shows that national interests could still prevail over the desire to make progress. Furthermore, 
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in light of PESCO’s intergovernmental decision-making structure, there is no guarantee that 
the new developments will bring enough political will to create a defence union with credible 
military hard power.  
 
Nevertheless, the strategic thinking of the EU and its member states is changing; this is 
especially evidenced by the fact that two non-PESCO members and strong Atlanticists (the 
UK and Denmark) joined the EI2. Although there is not a direct return to the situation of the 
Cold War, the aspect of territorial insecurity and military threat has returned, and the new US 
foreign policy demanding more military contribution from the EU member states has created 
the political will to rethink the benefit of P&S and EU capability development. This is why 
we can expect the member states to use the benefits of PESCO and the other defence 
initiatives.  
 
It seems that the new developments will not satisfy the tensions over the 2% norm military 
spending imbalance with the US and most European NATO members do not wish to 
immediately start spending huge amounts of money in order to reach this 2% norm. However 
the PESCO members did increase defence spending and allocated budget towards investments 
in capability development, which also benefits NATO. Thus, PESCO should not be seen as 
threatening NATO, but rather as strengthening the European pillar of NATO (Biscop, 2018). 
The EU still needs NATO for its security and deterrence, and without the US in particular, it 
will be unable to deter Russia’s nuclear strengths unless it begins capability development in 
that area as well. If the EU member states do not wish to spend vast amounts of money on 
improving their national defence capabilities to reach the 2 per cent, joint EU capability 
development could be the answer to the military hard power problem without the need to 
invest a great deal of money.  
 
The limitations experienced during my studies were: The fact that it is written from a 
European insider perspective and an outsider perspective could have given a different view on 
the events observed.  
 
For future research it is suggested that since the developments that should improve the EU’s 
security and defence policy are relatively new more research could be done to see whether 
they will have the effect on the EU’s security and defence policy in light of the security 
obstacles as described in this thesis.    
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5 Conclusion 
This research studied three types of obstacles that impacted new developments in Europe’s 
security and defence policy. 
 
The institutional challenges found in this study were as follows: an ineffective 
intergovernmental decision-making system, a lack of political will to overcome this decision-
making system in the CSDP and lack of use the potential of P&S of defence resources in the 
EDA, and differences in military strategic cultures (Atlanticists, Neutral or European) to 
cooperate in these institutions. As a result, the EU’s security and defence policy has been 
unable to provide enough military hard power for the security of its member states. However, 
member states could strategically rely on NATO for military hard power and (some) therefore 
resisted more EU defence cooperation or simply did not have the political will to improve this 
policy area, since the US secured them through NATO. This led the EU’s security and 
defence policy to become a soft power that focused on small- and medium-sized missions in 
the region while NATO provided Europe with military hard power. Moreover, in the wake of 
the financial crisis, the Europeans cut back on defence spending, which led to the further 
limitation of the EU’s hard power capabilities. Due to these institutional obstacles, the EU 
defence institution did not function in a way that allowed them to provide security to its 
members. 
 
The geopolitical obstacle found in this study is: Russia’s military actions, in combination with 
an opposing worldview and assertive foreign policy, form a geopolitical obstacle to the EU’s 
security. This creates a European feeling of territorial insecurity that requires the possession 
of military hard power to deter the RF.  
 
The strategic obstacle found in this study is: A new US foreign policy under Trump that 
demands more European military contribution to NATO. This contribution is necessary for 
the Europeans in order to continue receiving US protection through NATO. The fact that with 
Trump it is less likely that the US will come to the EU’s aid when they want to undertake a 
security mission comprising a strategic obstacle to the EU’s security.  
 
The EU responded to these obstacles with a new strategy that called for a stronger European 
security and defence policy to create military hard power in order to be better able to deter its 
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security threats. This led to new developments (such as PESCO, CARD, and the EDF) that 
affected the EU’s security and defence policy and are intended to enable the EU and its 
member states to create military hard power for better territorial resilience and strategic 
autonomy from the US for military missions, while also complementing and strengthening 
NATO and showing more European contribution to the alliance.  
 
The Europeans realise that they must do more for their own security and these new 
developments are needed to strengthen the EU’s security and defence policy, especially to 
create military capacities (hard power). As the member states only gave up limited 
sovereignty, however, developing hard power defence capabilities remains dependent on 
‘political will’. The Permanent Structured Cooperation Agreement’s new institutional setup, 
however, facilitates in creating this ‘political will’ by allowing the Commission to become a 
player with financial incentives. Secondly, the fact that PESCO projects are legally binding 
ensures that the member states remain committed to the process, which makes the prospect of 
creating hard power through the new developments at minimum highly promising.  
 
To conclude, the above-described institutional, geopolitical and strategic obstacles have 
forced the EU and its member states to rethink their security and defence policy in terms of 
conflicts in which military hard power is required. This led to new developments in the EU’s 
security and defence policy that may create enough hard power to resolve any current and 
future security conflicts within the EU context. 
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